Introduction
The global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-09 harbingered sweeping changes in the regulatory environment of financial markets and institutions throughout the world. Although even prior to the GFC, financial regulatory authorities -under the pressing need for hedge fund regulation -outspokenly called for hedge fund regulation, 1 such efforts faced stiff opposition from the hedge fund industry. Nonetheless, the enormity of the crisis and its economic and socio-political consequences were of such a magnitude that triggered a dramatic paradigm shift in financial regulation. This paradigm shift was markedly pronounced in the context of the hedge fund industry, the regulation of which was for long dormant on the regulatory agenda on both sides of the Atlantic.
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In the aftermath of the GFC, hedge funds were harshly criticized for destabilizing financial markets. 3 Perceived as the legacy of the American laissez-faire capitalism, hedge funds faced pungent animosity from politicians of the continental Europe. 4 Calling for their abolition, politicians demonized hedge funds as being 'crazy' and 'hellish', which "fall like a plague of locusts" over the companies, "devour everything, then fly on to the next one". 5 In the midst of the financial crisis, hedge funds and private equity firms were further vilified as "'aggressive'
gangs of 'speculators', bent on "snapping up firms, sacking workers and creaming off profits". 6 Against such a hostile backdrop, the sweeping waves of regulatory reforms were approach to hedge fund regulation mainly relies on market participants, such as counterparties and creditors to reign in the risk-taking behavior of hedge funds. Needless to say, such an approach corresponds to the indirect-regulation approach to hedge funds. In contrast to the direct regulation, which is applied directly to a hedge fund entity itself or to the activities immediately performed by those hedge funds, the indirect regulation constitutes "market discipline-inspired regulatory measures targeting the creditors and counterparties of hedge funds (mainly, but not exclusively, their prime brokers and securities brokers)." 11 In this regard, the hedge fund regulatory system in Europe provides a counterfactual to the hedge fund regulatory system in the U.S. for the purposes of comparison.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the first section, the evolution of the post-crisis U.S. hedgefund regulatory framework is presented. This part focuses on the hedge fund-related provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, particularly its Title IV, entitled "Regulation of Advisers to Hedge Funds and Others" the short title of which is the "Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2010" (hereinafter, the Private Fund Act). The Private Fund Act is an attempt to deal with potential systemic risks of hedge funds by introducing transparency requirements. Then, the Volcker Rule, embedded in the Title VI of the Dodd-Frank Act, which is an attempt to reduce the systemic risk concerns about hedge fund activities through addressing problems of interconnectedness of hedge funds with banks is studied. Thereafter, the provisions of the Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act regarding the "Enhanced Supervision and Prudential Standards for Nonbank Financial Companies", which aim to address the systemic risk concerns of potentially too-big-to-fail hedge funds are discussed. In the second section, the EU Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFMD) and its subsequent implementing measures adopted to address the potential contribution of hedge funds to financial instability are reviewed. Followed by a conclusion highlighting the main findings of the paper, the third section presents an early assessment of the promises and pitfalls of hedge fund regulation on both sides of the Atlantic in mitigating their potential contribution to financial instability. 
The Dodd-Frank Act and regulation of hedge funds
The Dodd-Frank Act, passed on July 21, 2010, triggered massive regulatory reforms and resulted in a major overhaul of the regulatory environment of the U.S. financial markets. 12 The U.S. regulation of hedge funds was mainly built upon indirect or market-discipline inspired regulation. Indirect regulation, which targets the counterparties of hedge funds, enhances market discipline on the hedge fund industry. In the U.S., the indirect regulation of hedge funds did not experience a dramatic change in the aftermath of the GFC. Even after the Private Fund Act, the U.S. hedge fund regulatory regime uses a mix of regulatory strategies, which heavily rely on the indirect regulation. The main market-discipline-enhancing regulatory reform in the U.S. involves registration and disclosure requirement studied below.
Addressing information problems and transparency requirements
The traditional mechanism for addressing information problems in the hedge fund industry is the imposition of requirements for registration and disclosure of certain information deemed to be necessary for assessing systemic risk. Since information problems in financial markets are perceived to be the main source of market failures, 13 there is compelling theoretical and empirical evidence in favor of disclosure requirements. 14 As is the case for systemic stability, the main reason for having a mandatory disclosure system for hedge funds is that such a system is indispensable for assessing systemic risk in financial markets. In the absence of mandatory 12 To promote financial stability and address systemic risk, the Dodd-Frank Act introduces far-reaching provisions focused on the macro-prudential regulation of financial institutions. Indeed, the reforms introduced by this Act are only comparable, in extent, depth and pace to the financial regulatory overhaul of the post-Great Depression era in the U. Once a company is designated as a SINBFC, it will be subject to the prudential regulation of the Fed. Furthermore, the FSOC has the discretion to recommend that the Fed strengthen the prudential standards on a particular SINBFC and apply standards that are "more stringent than those applicable to other nonbank financial companies and bank holding companies that do not present similar risks to the financial stability of the United States".
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In April 2012, the FSOC promulgated the final rules expounding the process of designating a NBFC as systemically important. 30 These rules introduce a three-stage process of evaluation in designating a NBFC as a SINBFC. The firms meeting the first stage requirements pass on to the next stage, and the firms meeting the second stage requirements pass on to the third stage.
A non-bank financial company passes on the first stage if its total consolidated assets are $50 billion or more and it meets or exceeds one of the following thresholds:
• $30 billion in gross notional credit default swaps (CDSs);
• $3.5 billion in derivatives liabilities;
• $20 billion in total debt outstanding;
• a leverage ratio of 15 to 1;
27 See 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(2). The considerations for designating the non-bank financial company as systemically important include, inter alia, 1. the extent of leverage; 2. off-balance sheet exposures; 3. the extent and nature of the transactions and relationships of the company with other significant NBFCs and significant bank holding companies (BHCs); 4. "the importance of the company as a source of credit for households, businesses, and State and local governments and as a source of liquidity for the United States financial system"; 5. whether the funds are managed or owned by the company; 6. the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, and mix of the activities of the company; 7. whether the company is already regulated by one or more financial regulatory agencies; 8. the amount and the nature of the financial assets of the company; 9. the amount and types of liabilities of the company including the degree of reliance on short-term funding; and 10. any other risk related factors that the FSOC deems necessary. See 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (a)(2); 12 CFR § 1310.11. 28 12 U.S.C. 5323(a)(2)(K) and (b)(2)(K). An analytical framework has been developed by the FSOC, which puts all relevant factors into six categories: size, interconnectedness, substitutability, leverage, liquidity risk and maturity mismatch, and existing regulatory scrutiny. 12 CFR § 1310, Appendix A. 29 12 U.S.C. § 5325(a)(1). 30 12 CFR § 1310.
• a ratio of total debt outstanding with maturity of less than 12 months to total consolidated assets of 0.1 (10 percent).
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In stage 2, the companies identified in the first stage will be analyzed. In this stage, in contrast to the quantitative thresholds of the first stage, the FSOC uses a wide range of quantitative and qualitative industry and firm-specific factors, which are available to it through public and regulatory resources, to evaluate the risk profile of the individual company. Following the stage 2, the NBFCs identified for additional review will receive notice of being considered for a 'Proposed Determination' and pass to the third stage in which they will be subject to an indepth evaluation.
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In Stage 3, the FSOC will assess the potential risks of the company based on the information, which is directly collected from the company, and on the public and regulatory information acquired in the process of the first and second stages. 
The Volcker Rule
The Volcker Rule-embedded in the Section 619 of the Title VI of the Dodd-Frank Act 39 is a structural regulation, 40 which aims to address three problems in financial markets: managing systemic risk by addressing the contagion channels between hedge funds and banks, managing conflicts of interest where banking entities engage in proprietary trading and investment in or sponsorship of hedge funds, and limiting the transfer of government subsidies from depository institutions to private funds (cross-subsidization of private funds by depository institutions).
These prime objectives are pursued by adopting provisions, which prohibit banking entities (depository institutions) from engaging in proprietary trading and investment in or sponsorship of hedge funds and private equity funds.
Since the greatest systemic risk concerns about the hedge fund industry originates from their interconnectedness with banks, 41 the Volcker Rule (bearing the name of its mastermind, Paul
Volcker) is an attempt to indirectly regulate hedge funds through direct regulation of banks, which often play the role of hedge fund counterparties, creditors, sponsors, investors, or prime brokers. The primary goal of this provision is to prohibit the banking system from speculative trading with the banks' own capital, mitigate the potential conflicts of interest between banking entity and its customers, and reduce the risks to the banks and non-bank financial companies designated as SINBFCs, which are subject to supervision by the Fed.
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The Volcker Rule is a two-pronged provision. It introduces restrictions on proprietary trading 43 as well as prohibitions on the investments in and sponsorship of hedge funds by banking entities. 44 First, the article studies the Volcker Rule's prohibition of proprietary trading, then, it turns to analyzing the Volcker Rule' prohibitions of investment and sponsorship of hedge funds and private equity funds by banking entities in light of its stated objectives.
Prohibitions on proprietary trading
Proprietary trading offers attractive opportunities for banks in terms of potential trading profits.
It is reported that in 2004, 75% of the $6.7 billion of Goldman's earnings before tax came from trading and investments. 45 However, the losses from proprietary trading played a role in putting LCFIs, such as Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Citigroup, at risk in the run-up to the GFC. 46 In addition, mixing risky security holdings with economically important financial intermediation within banks was perceived as one of the major causes of the recent financial crisis. 47 The proprietary trading provisions of the Volcker Rule prohibit a banking entity 48 from engaging in trading activities as principal to profit from the near-term price movements. 49 However, in order not to interfere with the smooth functioning of financial markets, the Volcker Rule exempts certain activities from the application of its prohibitions by accommodating certain exceptions as 'permitted activities'. 50 These permitted activities mainly involve banking activities perceived to be ultimately beneficial to the broader economy and necessary for maintaining the safety and soundness of financial institutions. 51 These permitted 43 The term 'proprietary trading' when used with respect to a banking entity or a SINBFC means "engaging as a principal for the trading account of The permitted activities are in turn subject to so-called prudential 'backstops'. 57 In other words, the Volcker Rule makes its exceptions subject to exceptions as a fallback strategy. These exceptions would require banning permitted activities if they result in material conflicts of interest between the banking entity and it clients, customers or counterparties, a material exposure by the banking entity to high-risk assets or high-risk trading strategies, pose a threat to safety and soundness of the banking entity, or pose a threat to financial stability of the United
States. 58
Restrictions on investment in hedge and private equity funds and prohibitions on covered transactions
The Volcker Rule provisions also prohibit a banking entity from investing in, or having certain relationships with hedge funds and private equity funds, as defined under the exclusions of the Investment Company Act of 1940. 59 These restrictions prohibit a banking entity from acquiring or retaining any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsoring a hedge fund or a private equity fund. 60 The Volcker Rule's prohibitions on investment in hedge and private equity funds and its prohibitions on proprietary trading basically share the same objectives.
Namely, not only do these restrictions intend to eliminate the federal support for speculative investing strategies of banking entities with their own capital, but also they intend to reduce the conflicts of interest between a banking entity and its customers. In the meantime, they strive to reduce the risk to banking entities and SINBFCs which are supervised by the Fed. The Volcker Rule's prohibitions on the banking entities' relationships with hedge funds are also subject to exceptions. A banking entity is allowed to organize and offer a fund in connection with its bona fide trust, fiduciary, and investment advisory services. 62 Under the Volcker Rule, a banking entity can offer prime brokerage services to hedge funds or private equity funds in which affiliated hedge funds of the banking entities have taken interest subject to the 'arm's length' requirements of the sections 23B of the Federal Reserve Act. Furthermore, since offering prime brokerage services is neither considered as sponsoring nor investing in hedge funds, by no means does the Volcker Rule prohibit a banking entity from offering prime brokerage services to independent hedge funds and private equity funds.
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As one of the exceptions to the Volcker Rule, taking or retaining a 3% or lower de minimis investment in a hedge fund or private equity fund that the banking entity organizes or offers in connection with bona fide trust, fiduciary and investment advisory functions is permitted subject to certain limitations and conditions. 64 The amount of the de minimis investment should be immaterial to the banking entity and should at most comprise up to 3% of the total ownership interest of such a fund following an initial one-year seeding period; namely, after one year from the fund's establishment. Within the one-year seeding period, the banking entity is allowed to provide even up to 100% of the capital of hedge funds or private equity funds. 65 However, the aggregate of all the interests of the banking entity in all hedge and private equity funds should not exceed 3% of the Tier 1 capital of the banking entity.
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The Volcker Rule further prohibits a banking entity, which serves as an investment manager, or adviser, or sponsor to a hedge or private equity fund and any affiliate of such entity, from entering into a 'covered transaction' as defined in Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act. provisions, the Volcker Rule accommodates limitations on the permitted activities under the provisions prohibiting certain business relationship of banking entities with hedge funds. Indeed, the same statutory 'backstops' for the permitted activities with respect to proprietary trading equally applies to permitted activities under the provisions limiting the business relationship of banking entity with hedge and private equity funds. These statutory backstops involve the circumstances under which the permitted banking entity's relationships with hedge and private equity funds result in a material conflict of interest, material exposure to high-risk assets or high-risk trading strategies, a threat to the safety and soundness of the banking entity, or a threat to the U.S. financial stability. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(2). 70 In most parts, the AIMFD is the equivalent of the Title IV of the hedge-fund related provisions of the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act.
In addition, following the Liikanen report, 71 a proposal on banking structural measures striving to improve the resilience of the EU credit institutions was published on January 29, 2014.
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The EU proposal on banking structural reforms, which is rightly viewed as the equivalent of the U.S. Volcker Rule, lays down rules aimed at imposing structural changes on too-big-too- Year 2012 Year , 2013 11. Given these numbers, it seems that given the size of the hedge fund industry in Europe, it attracted a disproportionate level of attention from regulators seeking to respond to the financial crisis. 82 , 'European Hedge Fund Assets Grow by 5% in First Half' (Hedge Fund Intelligence, 2015) <http://www.hedgefundintelligence.com/Article/3500701/EuroHedge-Industry-Analysis-Archive/Europeanhedge-fund-assets-grow-by-5-in-first-half.html> accessed March 7. Given that the hedge funds operating in the EU can hardly be considered systemically important, the EU regulation of hedge funds was partly motivated by insignificance of the size of the hedge fund industry, excluding other AIFs, and despite the fact that one of the main concerns throughout the regulatory process was the EU's premature and disproportionate reaction on the assumption of systemic importance of hedge funds, 83 EU regulators opted for hedge fund regulation.
The fact that the systemic risk channels through the interconnections of financial institutions and markets, and that it can be amplified by higher leverage, implies that hedge fund regulation should primarily target hedge funds' counterparties and particularly their creditors who are the main providers of leverage to hedge funds. In light of such an insight and based on the motives and the underlying reasons of the enactment of the AIFMD, it was expected that the AIFMD's focus be on hedge funds' interconnectedness with LCFIs. However, the AIFMD only marginally focuses on hedge funds' counterparties and the indirect regulation of hedge funds.
Instead, regulatory measures chosen to address potential systemic externalities of hedge funds took the form of direct regulation of hedge funds themselves (AIFs) or of their managers (AIFMs).
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A further significant difference between the EU and the U.S. hedge fund regulation is rooted in the basic underlying objectives of these two systems of financial regulation. In addition to investor protection and systemic risk concerns, European financial regulation has a third objective, which is the creation of a single European market to ensure free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital. 85 This objective is largely pursued by harmonization of laws at the EU level. Accordingly, the prevailing goal in the AIFMD is to provide an EU-wide consistent regulatory and supervisory framework for AIFMs. 86 To accomplish this goal, the incidents of fraud in hedge funds which resulted in losses to European investors (e.g., Madoff scandal). As a result, the EU regulatory approach focuses mainly on investor protection issues rather than systemic risk concerns. In contrast, in the U.S., the systemic risk concerns were the driving force behind the regulation of hedge funds. The AIFMD imposes greater degrees of direct regulation and supervision on AIFs or their managers than its counterpart in the U.S. 90 Indeed, the most significant difference between the U.S. and the EU regulatory measures is the extent to which the AIFMD exercises direct regulatory control over fund managers. Such divergent paths are especially apparent in Article 7 of the AIFMD, which grants enormous powers to the competent regulatory authorities of AIF's home Member States. This article specifically grants the power to the Member States'
See Eric Helleiner and Stefano Pagliari, The End of Self-Regulation? Hedge Funds and Derivatives in Global
Council with regards to exemptions, general operating conditions, depositories, leverage, transparency and supervision 87 Ibid 88 The goal of creating a single market in financial products can easily be spotted in many parts of the Directives regarding the EU securities regulation. For example, recital 2 of the 2004/39/EC Directive states this objective and clearly demonstrates how it sees a higher level of investor protection as a means to achieve such an end. It clearly states that "it is necessary to provide for the degree of harmonization needed to offer investors a high level of protection and to allow investment firms to provide services throughout the Community." 89 It might be the case that the EU regulators seized the opportunity to increase the share of the EU hedge fund industry by providing investor protection and passport mechanisms, rather than addressing systemic concerns which are not justified specifically in case of the EU hedge funds. Besides these overarching objectives, the AIFMD has more nuanced objectives, such as supervision of financial market players with appropriate authorization and on-going supervision, systemic risk oversight and monitoring macro-prudential risks by competent authorizes, risk management and enhanced management of micro-prudential risks in AIFs by AIFMs, transparency and greater public accountability of the AIFM investing and managing companies, and market efficiency and removal of barriers to efficient cross-border distribution and management of AIFs.
See Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment, Accompanying the document, Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regards to exemptions, general operating conditions, depositories, leverage, transparency and supervision.
In hedge fund regulation regimes, the investor protection concerns are traditionally achieved through restricting retail investors' access to hedge funds. Indeed, such investor protection schemes can also contribute to financial stability. Since accredited and sophisticated investors can protect themselves from fraud and most investment risks, investing in markets dominated by sophisticated investors potentially ensures that the systemic risks through credit channels will be mitigated. This is mostly due to the fact that they can ensure that the entities in which they invest or to which they have exposures are safe and sound and the risks of failures are minimal. Such a capability can mitigate the contagion of systemic risks through direct credit channel. On the other hand, assuming that the accredited investors -mainly composed of institutional investors -are best equipped to check the safety and soundness of their counterparties, the systemic risks through market channels can be reduced as well, due to the fact that they can ensure that their counterparties are well managed and their levels of leverage are reasonable. Such a market limit on leverage would ensure that these counterparties will not be subject to fire sales subsequent to margin calls. Therefore, entry limits for non-accredited investors not only can serve the investor protection purposes, but also it can indirectly serve the systemic stability in the shadow banking sector and mitigate the systemic risk of hedge funds. 105 In addition to the initial own funds, the Directive requires additional own funds adjusted to the value of the portfolio of the funds under management. Namely, if the value of the portfolios of the AIFs managed by the AIFMs exceeds €250 million, the AIFM is required to provide an additional amount of its own funds equal to 0.02% of the amount of assets managed in excess of €150 million. However, the total of the initial capital and the additional amount must not exceed €10 million. 
Leverage and limits for leveraged funds
Information on leverage is essential for regulators to monitor systemic risk. 107 Inadequate disclosure of leverage can inhibit the micro-and macro-prudential supervision of the potential risks posed by AIFs. 108 Therefore, imposing reporting requirements on hedge funds' leverage is essential to monitoring systemic risk. Indeed, one of the most significant attempts to regulate potential systemic risks of hedge funds in the EU is the introduction of the leverage requirements by the AIFMD. 109 The AIFMD offers a very broad definition of leverage.
Leverage is defined in the AIFMD as "any method by which the AIFM increases the exposure of an AIF it manages, whether through borrowing of cash or securities, or leverage embedded in derivative positions or by any other means".
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The AIFMD requires the AIFMs to set a maximum level of leverage that they may employ on behalf of each AIF they manage. 111 Setting those leverage limits, the AIFMs should take into account, inter alia, the type of the AIF, the investment strategies of the AIF, the sources of leverage of the AIF, any other interconnectedness or relevant relationship with other systemically important financial institutions, the need to limit the exposure to any single counterparty, the extent to which the leverage is collateralized, the asset-liability ratio, and the scale, nature and extent of the activity of the AIFM on the markets concerned. 112 The AIFM should also disclose the use of leverage by each AIF under its management on a regular basis.
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When hedge fund managers employ "leverage on a substantial basis", additional disclosure requirements will be triggered. 
Risk Management
The Directive requires AIFMs to establish an adequate risk management system for identifying, measuring, managing, and monitoring risks of each AIF under their management.
The Directive further requires functional and hierarchical separation of risk management and portfolio management functions subject to exceptions for small AIFMs at the Member State level when the separation of these two functions is operationally impracticable. 115 Such functional and hierarchical separation of the risk management function should be ensured throughout the entire hierarchical structure of the AIFM, up to its governing body. 116 The AIFMs should also conduct stress tests of the risks associated with the investments made by the AIFs under their management, conduct an appropriate, documented and regularly updated due diligence process when investing on behalf of the AIF, and ensure that the risk profile of each AIF they manage corresponds to the size, portfolio structure, and investment strategy and objectives of the AIF as set out in the fund rules and offering documents. In addition, the AIFMD requires the AIFMs to establish specific safeguards against conflicts of interest, to facilitate the independent performance of risk management activities and demonstrate that the risk management process is consistently effective. 117
Liquidity Management
In addition to capital requirements, the AIFMD also regulates hedge fund liquidity. The
Directive requires that the AIFMs, for each fund under their management, which is not an unleveraged closed-ended AIF, establish an appropriate liquidity management system and adopt procedures enabling them to monitor the liquidity risks of the AIF, and ensure the compliance of liquidity profile of the investments of the AIF with its underlying obligations. will be as prone to bailouts as it used to be prior to the Dodd-Frank Act. 121 Others view potential regulatory arbitrage as the element that can render many regulatory measures of the DoddFrank Act toothless. 122 Early empirical studies also suggest that the hedge fund industry is not dramatically affected by the new regulatory measures. and can help harness market discipline.
Since hedge funds are unlikely to fall under the purview of direct regulation, they will mainly be regulated indirectly. However, there are concerns that market discipline, which will be enforced by hedge fund counterparties and creditors within the indirect-regulation regime, cannot effectively address their potential risks. Particularly, it is argued that the prime brokers are not adequately equipped to monitor the liquidity risks of hedge funds.
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Another commendable move by the Private Fund Act is that it takes a laddered regulatory approach to regulation of hedge funds. The benchmark for direct regulation of hedge funds in the U.S. is their size. Hedge funds with less than $50 billion in consolidated assets cannot be considered as SINBFCs. 126 Since the number of advisers exceeding the $50 billion AUM subject to regulation is extremely limited, 127 it is expected that the contingent direct regulation The consolidated assets of the LTCM were $125 billon at its peak. There might be instances that even smaller hedge funds might be considered as such. 127 As of 2012, only four hedge funds out of 50 hedge funds, which are registered pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, exceed the $50 billion threshold. Therefore, the number of advisers exceeding the limit will be very limited. The Managed Funds Association (MFA), a hedge fund industry association, estimates that applying the thresholds of the §113 of the Act, it is highly unlikely that any hedge fund would be designated as a SINBFC.
will be of a very limited impact on hedge funds and their liquidity. 128 In addition, the advisers who are approaching the threshold may divest of some assets to avoid being designated as SINBFC. Such a regulatory strategy is well designed to push the hedge funds, which are in the periphery of the financial system, not to approach to the apex of the system. If the prudential regulation by the Federal Reserve would be optimally priced, it will decrease the probability that the law would apply to them with considerable elasticity. 129 The dark side of the laddered regulatory approach is that it is based on hedge funds' size. A regulatory regime relying on size-thresholds is unlikely to address the risks arising from a large number of hedge funds' potential herd behavior. Since the Dodd-Frank Act is opted for firmby-firm designation of hedge funds as SINBFCs, it is unlikely that it can address the herd behavior of small and mid-sized hedge funds. 130 The bright side of such a regulatory strategy, however, is that it will induce hedge funds to reduce their size to avoid being designated as SINBFC and ensuing heavier and costlier regulation. As mentioned earlier, this strategy in fact discourages firms from getting closer to the apex of the financial system. 131 Few hedge funds will be designated as SINBFCs and become subject to the direct regulations of the Fed. Most hedge fund leverage and liquidity regulation will rest with the prime brokers, which in turn are regulated by the Federal Reserve.
One of the policy relevant aspects of hedge fund regulation relates to the transient nature of hedge funds. 132 Structurally and organizationally, banks are capable of developing robust and complex regulatory compliance department, because they have longer life-expectancy and there are considerable economies of scale in banks' regulatory costs. 133 Whereas taking account of higher attrition rates 134 in the hedge fund industry, it might not be optimal to force shortlived and relatively small hedge funds to develop regulatory compliance departments. 135 Such regulatory requirements can damage start-up and small hedge funds disproportionately. 136 Last but not certainly least, what matters most in financial reporting is timing, and it is not clear whether regulators react to information as quickly as markets do, or quickly enough to have an impact on countering systemic risk. Given the inherent sluggishness of regulation and legal processes, it is highly unlikely that regulators can use disclosed information by hedge funds to mitigate concerns about systemic risk and financial instability.
The Volcker Rule
In addition to its three main objectives, i.e., addressing interconnectedness, conflicts of interest and cross-subsidization problems, the Volcker Rule should also avoid putting U.S. banks in competitive disadvantage in global markets dominated by universal banks. 137 It is clear that achieving all these often-competing objectives is the greatest challenge of the Volcker Rule.
In terms of achieving these objectives, the Volcker Rule was only partially successful; the first reason being the political compromises made in the process of legislation. Indeed, Paul Volcker himself is quoted saying that the bill (containing the Volcker Rule) "went from what is best to what could be passed" in the process of its enactment. 138 The most striking of these compromises are best depicted in the extensive exceptions to the provisions of the Volcker Rule, which made it practically toothless. 139 Facing such exceptions, even Paul Volcker himself admits that the success of the Volcker Rule depends much on the way it is going to be implemented.
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In addition to the political compromises, one of the key aspects of the implementation of the Volcker Rule is how to distinguish permitted activities from prohibited activities. 141 The problem of distinguishing such activities ultimately boils down to a definitional problem.
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Future definitions of the key terms in the Volcker Rule will play a major role in minimizing the risk of evasion of the Volcker Rule's provisions. 143 The question is whether regulators would be able to create mechanisms to distinguish prohibited activities from permitted For example, the Volcker Rule only allows banking entities to offer organized or sponsored funds only to 'customers' of a banking entity. In this respect, there is a need for a definition of the word 'customer' in order not to allow all its clients and counterparties to take advantage of the term 'customer'. As an additional example, the de minimis exception applies in two cases. It is applied "to restrict the exposure of a banking entity to 3% of any single fund" and also to limit the banking entity's aggregate exposure to 3% of its Tier 1 capital. The Volcker Rule is viewed as the Dodd-Frank Act's version of Glass-Steagall's separation of investment banking from commercial banking, and accordingly it is dubbed the Glass-Steagall
Lite. 151 It follows that the Volcker Rule can be subject to most of the criticisms pointed to the Glass-Steagall Act, which culminated in its erosion through time and its repeal in 1999. 152 For instance, the Volcker Rule's prohibition on proprietary trading might increase systemic risk, because it would not allow banking entities to adequately diversify their risks. 153 However, the concerns about adverse effects of the Volcker Rule on diversification of banking entities and its overall impact on financial instability is unfounded, because it is only idiosyncratic or firm-specific risk (and not systemic risk) that can be diversified away. 154 In the same vein, it is argued that although diversification, originating from mixing bank and nonbank activities, can reduce the likelihood of individual banking default, it increases the likelihood of systemic risk. 155 In other words, the fact that integrated conglomerates composed of both banks and non-banks are financed by risk-insensitive (or information-insensitive) deposits weakens market discipline on their non-bank divisions. Therefore, those divisions will tend to take more risks. Such a conclusion, namely -the cost of mixing traditional banking activities with other financial services within financial holding companies (FHCs) increases the market risk of the firm-is also supported by recent empirical evidence suggesting that diversification gains are more than offset by the costs associated with the exposure to volatile activities. 156 In addition, since a banking entity's main function is maturity transformation, banks have special cost-advantage in servicing loans to households, small businesses and other industrial sectors, which cannot be easily replicated outside the banking sector. In other words, the bank loans are not substitutable. 157 Another criticism based on the analogy of the Volcker Rule with the Glass-Steagall Act is predicated on highlighting the potential forgone efficiencies in terms of economies of scale and scope. 160 Theory and empirical evidence on optimal size of a banking entity is mixed. On the one hand, the efficient size for a banking entity might be very low. 161 On the other hand, empirical evidence shows substantial economies of scale in the banking industry. 162 In addition, it is suggested that big banks' profitability might not be attributable to efficiencies in scale, but it should be studied in light of the implicit guarantees offered to too-big-to-fail banks. The distortive effect of these guarantees is such that achieving too-big-to-fail status and gaining access to implicit government guarantees motivated some mergers in the banking sector.
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Therefore, it seems that the objections to the Volcker Rule which aims at prohibiting depository institutions from engaging in proprietary trading or spinning-off their hedge funds and private equity funds on the grounds of diversification and economies of scale and scope are not founded on sound theoretical and empirical evidence.
With respect to prohibiting cross-subsidization of hedge funds through banks, the basic argument for the Volcker Rule is that it is not justifiable to let the financial institutions invest on their own accounts while funding their activities at below-market rates coming from the government explicit and implicit guarantees. 164 investment of banks in hedge funds and private equity funds particularly in those funds that are in the start-up phase.
With respect to conflicts of interest, the extensive exceptions in the Volcker Rule, both to proprietary trading and investment in hedge funds and private equity funds, though marginally mitigate conflicts of interest, fall short of providing a conflict-of-interest-proof environment for all stakeholders, notably the banking entity, its customers, and hedge funds. However, it remains to be seen how monitoring and management of conflicts of interest will be conducted in practice. 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive
Hedge fund regulation in the EU is more concerned with investor protection as a prerequisite for building a European single market for the AIF industry than systemic risk. Therefore, it is not surprising that a large number of articles of the AIFMD are directly or indirectly dedicated to the furtherance of the investor protection objectives as a means to create single market in AIFs rather than addressing systemic risk. 166 However, this article argues that investor protection concerns of the EU regulators are mostly unfounded, because the investor base of the AIFs consists of professional investors who have the proper means to protect themselves.
Therefore, the AIFMD's focus on investor protection in hedge fund regulation can be seen as a misallocation of regulatory resources.
Except in exceptional cases such as rules on depositaries, the Directive is more inclined to regulate hedge funds directly. The direct regulation of hedge funds is consistent with the aim of building a single market for AIFs and investor protection issues; however, it is inconsistent with the aim of regulating potential systemic risk of hedge funds.
In addition to the criticisms directed at the direct regulation of hedge funds in the EU, the AIFMD is criticized on several grounds. First, with respect to the definitions and scope, the are not as strict as the ones imposed in the EU, the likelihood of regulatory arbitrage increases.
Furthermore, imposition of such requirements on hedge funds can deprive financial markets from the benefits of hedge funds, such as their contribution to diversification and liquidity, their contribution to market resiliency, market efficiency, and their role in the price discovery mechanism. In addition, hedge funds' contrarian position taking, their potential role in mitigating the effects of sudden shocks to the financial system, smoothing the market volatility, and reducing the magnitude of asset price bubbles might be compromised.
The most efficient approach to moderate leverage and mitigate its risks lies in the regulatory reform of the banking sector. 169 Prior to the AIFMD, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) proposed the mandatory registration, regulation and supervision of prime brokers and banks providing leverage to hedge funds to monitor their leverage. 170 In other words, the IOSCO supported indirect regulation of hedge funds to address the risks arising from their leverage. Nonetheless, the AIFMD opted for direct regulation of hedge fund leverage. In contrast, the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act opts for indirect regulation of hedge funds' leverage through restricting the relationships of the banking entities with hedge funds by introducing the Volcker Rule.
171
The direct regulation of leverage of hedge funds, as adopted by the AIFMD, can have at least two negative unintended consequences. First, leverage constraints on hedge funds will affect certain types of hedge funds disproportionately. For example, hedge funds specialized in arbitrage-type investment strategies such as convertible arbitrage, fixed-income arbitrage and equity market neutral will severely be affected. potentially limit the expected return on such strategies, it will have a chilling effect on the funds employing these strategies. 172 Secondly, the impact of direct leverage requirements on financial markets is that the limitations of leverage for arbitrage-based hedge funds will lower the market liquidity and will result in less efficient price discovery mechanisms. As a result, more price distortions and dislocations will remain intact, because less and less capital will be deployed to exploit such inefficiencies. All in all, imposing leverage constraints can make the markets less efficient due to the limits they impose on the ability of hedge funds to employ arbitrage-type strategies. 173 Therefore, it seems that monitoring leverage is best to be performed by prime brokers.
The bright side of leverage requirements of the AIFMD is that the Directive does not engage in the micro-management of the leverage of hedge funds; instead, it only sets general standards, such as caps for leverage and imposes disclosure requirements on funds' leverage. Indeed, unlike the draft proposal of the AIFMD which attempted to directly regulate hedge-fund leverage, except in exceptional circumstances, the AIFMD delegates the micro-management of leverage to AIFMs. However, regarding leverage requirements, the AIFMD does not focus on the interconnectedness of hedge funds with LCFIs (such as their prime brokers as the main leverage providers of hedge funds), whose knowledge of hedge fund business better place them to monitor hedge funds' risks arising from excessive leverage.
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Although EU regulators provide countervailing benefits to European hedge funds, such as passport mechanism and enhanced investor protection to offset the costs of regulation, it is essentially an empirical question to evaluate whether the benefits of hedge fund regulation in the EU will outweigh its costs. An additional benefit that European regulators can offer to hedge funds is to encourage greater retailization of hedge funds. Given the heightened level of investor protection offered by the AIFMD to investors in hedge funds, the Member States can relax the requirements for retail investors to invest in hedge funds. Providing lower standards for investing in hedge funds can attract more hedge funds to the European markets. Such a development has already been ongoing in the U.S. With increasing regulation of hedge funds in the U.S. after the Dodd-Frank Act, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (the JOBS Act)
was enacted according to which hedge funds can solicit the general public. However, hedge 172 Bianchi and Drew, 'Hedge Fund Regulation and Systemic Risk' 173 Ibid 174 As mentioned earlier, on January 29, 2014, the European Commission proposed a final proposal on structural measures improving the resilience of the EU credit institutions which is the equivalent of the U.S. Volcker Rule.
funds should make sure that only accredited investors invest in their funds. In addition, there are jurisdictions, such as Australia, which do not impose restrictions on retail investments in hedge funds. 175 It seems that with the level of protection that the AIFMD offers to investors, restrictions on raising capital from retail investors could at least be relaxed.
Overall, the legislative process of the AIFMD suggests that hedge fund regulation in the EU was a politically motivated overreaction to their perceived contribution to financial instability.
The main objective of the Directive seems to be the creation of a single market for AIFs rather than addressing systemic risk. The EU regulators' emphasis on the investor protection can also be understood in light of creating a European single market for financial services. Despite the fact that the impetus for the enactment of the AIFMD was the concerns about hedge funds' systemic aspects and their contribution to financial instability, hedge fund regulation in the EU only marginally addressed systemic risk concerns and more in general, the risks that hedge funds can potentially pose to financial stability.
Conclusion
This article compares hedge fund regulation in the U.S. and the EU; two jurisdictions constituting the biggest centers hosting the hedge fund industry. Although regulatory responses to the perceived contribution of hedge funds to financial instability originated from virtually the same course of events, the final outcome was the emergence of divergent regulatory paths across the Atlantic. This divergence constitutes a great divide in transatlantic regulation with respect to the overarching regulatory strategies towards hedge funds, where the direct regulation of hedge funds is pursued by EU regulators, and indirect regulation by U.S. regulators. Building upon the turmoil of the financial crisis and using it as a pretext for expanding their regulatory turf, EU regulators-primarily concerned with creating a single market for financial services-put forward proposals for hedge fund regulation within which a passport mechanism was embedded. Considering the passport mechanism as a means to achieve creating a single market for AIFs, and backing up the passport mechanism by investor protection mechanisms, the EU regulators introduced the AIFMD. Given the priority of creating a single market for AIFs, systemic risk concerns are only marginally addressed in the AIFMD. In contrast, the main concern in the U.S. still remained to be systemic risk of hedge fund, which gave birth to the Private Fund Act, the Volcker Rule and the authority granted to the FSOC to designate hedge funds as SINBFC.
On the one hand, such divergent regulatory approaches gave shape to the indirect and lighttouch regulation with a focus on potentially too-big-to-fail hedge funds, the interconnectedness of hedge funds with LCFIs, and the adoption of a laddered regulatory approach to hedge fund regulation in the U.S. On the other hand, in Europe, investor protection concerns engendered a more stringent and direct regulatory framework for hedge funds.
Although Europe had the bold idea of leading the way in setting out global standards for hedge fund regulation, its regulatory approach is detrimental to the European hedge fund industry.
Europe's crack-down on hedge funds is likely to put them in competitive disadvantage, encourage regulatory arbitrage, and give rise to relocation of the industry to off-shore jurisdictions. Whereas, given the heavy-handed requirements in the EU, it is highly unlikely that regulatory arbitrage, in terms of exodus of U.S. hedge funds to Europe, would be a concern for U.S. regulators.
This article also sheds light on the potential future developments in regulating hedge funds on both sides of the Atlantic. It argues that the EU regulatory policy towards hedge funds, particularly in areas involving the direct regulation of hedge funds originating from investor protection concerns, should be revisited. Instead, the regulatory focus should be shifted towards indirect regulation of hedge funds targeting their interconnectedness with LCFIs and their potential herd behavior. Otherwise, given the heightened level of investor protection offered by the AIFMD to investors in hedge funds, the restrictions on raising capital from retail investors could at least be partially relaxed to offset the regulatory burden and prevent regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds.
